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Logic, Linguistics, and Intelligent Interaction In logic the distinc-
tions between language, interpretation and communication are quite clear,
in natural language understanding less so. But maybe natural language se-
mantics has something to learn from new directions in logic. A first lesson
was taught by Richard Montague long ago, but there are some new things
to learn now.
Logic, narrowly conceived, is the design and use of formal languages for
thought, the study of their strengths and limitations (the trade-off between
expressive power and complexity), and the use of these tools in clarifying
what goes on in the mind of a mathematician, or in the memory of a com-
puter carrying out a program. Montague’s lesson for NL understanding was
that NL can be studied with the methods from logic.
Broadly conceived, logic is the study of intelligent interaction, ratio-
nal adjustment on the basis of evidence, transformation of our conceptu-
alisations of the world on the basis of received information. See [1] for an
overview, and for a logic textbook emphasizing this broader perspective.
Intelligent interaction is also a central topic in natural language under-
standing, for intelligent interaction is what natural langauge is for. A desire
to explain why human beings are so good at communication using language
is one of the reasons for being interested in linguistics.
Formal Models of Communication In dynamic epistemic logic (see [3]
or [2]), a state of affairs is a multi-agent Kripke model, and acts of communi-
cation are operations on states of affairs. The Kripke model represents what
the agents know (or believe). If an agent a is uncertain about the truth of
p, this is represented by an inability of a to distinguish p-worlds from non
p-worlds. The act of communication represents how this knowledge (or this
belief) gets changed by information exchange.
A paradigm example is public announcement. A public announcement
of a true fact p has the following effect on a Kripke model. All non p-worlds
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get removed from the model, and the accessibility relations representing the
knowledge or belief of the agents get restricted to the new class of worlds.
The result is that p becomes common knowledge among all agents. But
many other kinds of communication can be modelled: messages to specific
individuals, messages to all agents that happen to pay attention, and so on.
Knowledge, Belief, and Probability In epistemic/doxastic logic (the
logic of knowledge and belief), there is also a new trend, where knowledge
and belief are linked to probability theory. Theories of subjective probability
[6] agree well with Kripke model representations of knowledge and belief.
To turn a Kripke model into a probabilistic model, all one has to do is
to add, for each agent, a probability distribution over the set of all worlds
to the model [5]. Knowledge of a cannow be linked to certainty: assigning
probability 1 to a statement. Belief can be linked to assigning probability
> 12 to a statement.
This way, it is possible to explain certain properties of belief that are hard
to cope with without bringing in probabilities. If an agent believes p (say:
‘Bonfire is not a winner’) and also believes q (say: ‘Salinero is not a winner’),
it does not follow that the agent also believes p ∧ q. So belief is not closed
under conjunction, and hence the belief operator is not a normal modal
operator (in the technical sense:  is normal if from φ and (φ → ψ) it
follows that ψ).
Connection with Natural Language Semantics Probabilistic seman-
tics for natural language would link language (content words) to the world
in a loose way (looser than the traditional truth-functional way), in the per-
spective of an agent (here is where subjective probabilities of the ‘knowing
subject’ come in).
Example: vague or uncertain attribution. ‘Bonfire is black’. In a proba-
bilistic Kripke model M , in a world w, for an agent a, this gets a probability
Pa,w. If the probability is 1, this means that a knows that Bonfire is black,
and it follows that it is true that Bonfire is black. In a case where the state-
ment is judged as less than certain by a, we can say that a believes that
Bonfire is black. Now it does not follow that it is true that Bonfire is black.
Program Work out a probabilistic multi-agent semantics for natural lan-
guage along these lines. See [4] for a first sketch. Connect up with work on
distributional semantics.
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